Tuesday 24 December 2013

History of R.B.I.


The legislation to set up the Reserve Bank of India was first introduced in January 1927, but the enactment became an accomplished fact on March 1934. There is, however, a long history, which has been traced to as far back as 1773, when Warren Hasting; Governor of Bengal; placed before the board of revenue his ‘Plan’ for a ‘General Bank in Bengal and Bihar’. The plan for the proposed bank was approved by the Board, with some changes, and the bank was set up in April 1773, but it proved to be only a short-lived experiment. On April 13, 1774, the Court of Directors of the East India Company wrote to the Governor-General in Council recommending certain changes in respect of the bank. Hastings and Barwell opposed the changes, but they were overruled by their other three colleagues, Francis, Monson and Clavering, who succeeded in getting passed a resolution on February 15, 1775, providing for the closure of the bank ; however, the managers were given five or six months to wind up the bank’s affairs.

It must be mentioned that in India, as in many other countries, matters relating to currency and exchange, such as the question of the monetary standard and the exchange rate, received far more attention than the subject of banking, especially central banking. Also, for long, the interconnection between currency and banking does not appear to have been grasped widely. The schemes for such a banking establishment drawn up from time to time reflected, to some extent, the gradual evolution of central banking which had been taking place in other countries during those years. Though it cannot be said precisely when the term ‘central banking’ originated, history shows that the two oldest functions of a central bank, viz., those of ‘note issue’ and ‘banker to Government’, were carried out in several countries by either an existing bank or a new one set up for the purpose, even before such a bank came to be known as the ‘central bank’. These banks, which were called ‘banks of issue’, were doing general banking business as well. A clearer concept of central banking later emerged, and central banking came to be regarded as a special category of business, quite distinct from commercial banking.

In 1836, a proposal for a ‘Great Banking Establishment for British India’ was submitted to the Court of Directors of the East India Company by a body of merchants in England having trade relations with India. The memorandum stated that the Bank of Bengal – which was the only Presidency Bank in existence at that time – was prevented from being as efficient and as useful ‘as a Bank ought to be and might be made’, because of its ‘immediate connection’ with Government. ‘The Great Banking Establishment’, the merchants proposed, was to be set up under an Act of Parliament and was to have adequate resources. The establishment of such a bank would, according to the memorandum, facilitate ‘the employment of a portion of the redundant capital of this country (England) for the general improvement of Indian commerce, giving stability to the monetary system of India . . .’. The bank was to transact public business at a moderate charge, manage public debt and facilitate revenue receipt and expenditure. During the end of nineteenth and beginning of twentieth century, it was proposed at that time to amalgamate the three Presidency Banks into one strong institution; the central banking functions envisaged for the new institution were not only those of note issue and banker to Government, as in the earlier proposals, but also maintenance of the gold standard, promoting gold circulation as well as measuring and dealing with requirements of trade for foreign remittances. The new bank was to perform commercial banking functions as well, as the Presidency Banks had been doing till then.

In 1870, Mr. Ellis, Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, suggested the setting up of ‘one State Bank for India’ under complete Government control, with branches at the Presidency towns, generally on the model of the Bank of France. The Government of India, at about that time wrote: ‘We look upon the establishment of a State Bank in India as a matter of great uncertainty, perhaps of impossibility’. They took the view that it might not be possible to induce really able and experienced men to come to India and manage such a bank.

In the early twenties of this century, central banking came to be treated as a separate class of business, distinct from commercial banking; it was considered that a single institution could not suitably perform both types of functions. The Hilton Young Commission was appointed in August 2005 ‘to examine and report on the Indian exchange and currency system and practice; to consider whether any modifications are desirable in the interests of India; and to make recommendations’. Thus, in 1926, the Hilton Young Commission recommended the setting up of an institution the Reserve Bank of India – which was to be entrusted with pure central banking functions; it was to take over from the Imperial Bank such of the central banking functions as that institution had been performing till then, and the Imperial Bank was to be left free to do only commercial banking business. The Gold Standard and Reserve Bank of India Bill, to implement the recommendations of the Hilton Young Commission, was introduced in the Legislative Assembly on January 25, 1927. The Bank was to take over the management of the currency from the Governor-General in Council and was to carry on the business of banking in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The Bill was referred to a Joint Committee of 28 members, in March 1927. The Report of the Joint Committee was not unanimous. Of the twenty-five members who signed the Report, seventeen including the Finance Member Sir Basil Blackett, appended minutes of dissent, while three members stated that they would move amendments in the House on the points on which they disagreed. The minute of dissent signed by the Finance Member and six others was mainly in respect of the controversial clauses relating to the ownership of the Bank and the composition and constitution of the Board. They, however, made it clear that they had confined their observations only to clauses to which they attached ‘special importance’, and had refrained from commenting on other provisions with which also they were not in entire agreement. Three other members in separate minutes of dissent broadly supported the Finance Member in respect of the controversial clauses.

In the Legislative Assembly on August 29, 1927, on representation it was reported by the Joint Committee that to be taken into consideration, that the Finance Member stated there was ‘practical unanimity’ between Him and the Committee, as to what the Reserve Bank was to do. The differences of opinion were in regard to the constitution of the Bank and the method of constituting its Directorate. Sir Basil also emphasized that while the Joint Committee opposed a shareholders’ bank, it shared the Government’s view that the Bank should be completely independent of Government.

So the main controversy on proposals for a central bank related to the questions of ownership – State versus private ownership and management of such a bank. The more interesting thing about this controversy, which had an element of shadow boxing about it, was that both the schools of thought desired ‘independence’ of the bank from Government control in its day-to-day working. It was more a matter of difference of approach with regard to the method of selection of the Directors of the Governing Board, an element of nomination by Government being present in all the schemes. Even in the proposals where the whole of the capital was to be provided by Government, not all the Directors were to be nominated by Government: there was provision for an element of election or selection. The consensus among the Indian leaders was against any scheme of selection of the Directorate by private shareholders. Some other arrangements, such as selection by Chambers of Commerce and the
Legislature, were proposed. But the active participation of the Legislature in the selection of the Board had its own snags. These arrangements were not acceptable to the British Government in India, who preferred to keep the Legislature out of the scheme and retain residuary powers with the Governor-General. In the end, this view prevailed. Anyway, this controversy was responsible for considerable delay in the establishment of the Bank.

In January 1928, the Government of India published a new Gold Standard and Reserve Bank Bill. The Bill broadly followed the 1927 Bill, as amended by the Joint Committee, important exceptions being the provisions relating to the ownership of the Bank and the constitution and composition of the Board. As regards the ownership of the Bank, the new Bill, like the original 1927 Bill, provided for a shareholders’ bank.

On February 6, 1929, when a question was asked in the Legislative Assembly whether Government intended to bring before the Legislature a Reserve Bank Bill in the near future, Government’s reply was in the negative. Government were convinced that a central bank was in the country’s interest, but they could only proceed subject to their being satisfied as to two conditions : first; that the organisation of the Bank is to be securely settled on sound lines ; second; that there is an adequate measure of general support among the representatives of public opinion for the proposals.

From 1930-31 onwards, the question of establishing a Reserve Bank for India received fresh impetus, in connection with the consideration of constitutional reforms for the country. In their dispatch dated September 20, 1930 on proposals for constitutional reforms the Government of India stated in unambiguous terms that

the formation of a Reserve Bank on sound lines was in their view to be a condition precedent to any transfer of financial responsibility from the agents of Parliament to a minister answerable to the Indian Legislature’.                                  - O. P. Gupta, op. cit.

Another development, meanwhile, was the submission of the Report of the Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee (1931) which also strongly recommended the establishment of a Reserve Bank ‘at the earliest possible date’. The foreign experts advising the Committee endorsed the recommendation observing:

The paramount interests for the country involved in the establishment, within the shortest time possible, of such an independent institution, free from political influence, can hardly be over-estimated’.

Meanwhile, a Departmental Committee was appointed in London by the India Office, with Mr. R. A. Mant as the Chairman, named India Office Committee, to advice upon the nature of Reserve Bank legislation. The Committee was against any Member of the Legislature or any officer of the Government from becoming a member of the Board. As regards appointing shareholders’ Directors, in the Committee’s view, neither the 1927 nor the 1928 Bill would secure the desired objectives. The India Office Committee’s Report was followed up by the appointment in London of another committee to draft a Reserve Bank Bill. This ‘London Committee’ comprised authorities on central banking, financial administrators from India and Great Britain, Members of the Indian Legislature and representatives of the business community. The Bill was referred to a Joint Select Committee for the reason not only that a precedent had been established in the case of the 1927 Bill but also that the London Committee desired further consideration being given in India to certain vital issues like the initial proportion of gold and sterling assets to be held against the note issue, the valuation of the gold reserves to be taken over by the Reserve Bank from Government, the power of the Bank to take part in open market operations, the relations of the Reserve Bank with the Imperial Bank of India and the compensation to be paid to the Imperial Bank for the loss of some of its functions.

The Reserve Bank of India Bill, 1933, drafted on the basis of the recommendations of the London Committee, was introduced in the Legislative Assembly by the Finance Member, Sir George Schuster, on September 8, 1933. In his speech introducing the Bill, the Finance Member explained the significance of a Reserve Bank in the constitutional plan as follows:

It has generally been agreed in all the constitutional discussions and the experience of all other countries bears this out, that when the direction of public finance is in the hands of a ministry responsible to a popularly elected Legislature, a ministry which would for that reason be liable to frequent change with the changing political situation, it is desirable that the control of currency and credit in the country should be in the hands of an independent authority which can act with continuity . . . Further, the experience of all countries is again united in leading to the conclusion that the best and indeed the only practical device for securing this independence and continuity is to set up a Central Bank, independent of political influence’.

The Bill was referred to a Joint Select Committee on September 13, 1933, and as amended by the Committee was introduced in the Legislative Assembly on November 27, 1933, at a special session. This session was not attended by the Congress party, which had vigorously and successfully championed the principle of State ownership of the proposed Reserve Bank, when the 1927 Bill came up before the Legislature. The Bill was passed by the Assembly on December 22, 1933, and by the Council of State on February 16, 1934. The Bill received the assent of the Governor-General on March 6, 1934.
                                                




[Source: RBI (1935-51); 1970]

Friday 13 December 2013

Factors of Interest Rates


Interest rate represent the cost of money. For long term (more than one year) financing, standard banking practice is to use the nominal rate to calculate the interest payments on the outstanding or declining balance of a loan. 

The most important issue affecting the imputation of future cash flows lies in our judgement about the extent to which savings and current accounts can be portrayed as long term liabilities. In practice, banks all over the world have observed that these deposits have longer effective maturities or reprising periods (Houpt & Embersit 1991). To the extent that these liabilities prove to be long dated, banks would be able to buy long dated assets, and earn the long-short spread, without incurring interest rate expose.

The extent to which savings and current deposits would move when interest rate changed is a behavioral assumption, and alternative assumptions could have a significant impact upon our estimates of interest rate risk.

We have a scenario tilted RBI, which uses RBI’s requirements for the interest rate risk statement. It involves assuming that 78% of savings deposits are “stable”, and that these have an effective maturity of three to six months. This appear to be an usually short time horizon, gives (a) a strong stability of savings account and (b) the long time till modification of the savings bank interest rate in India. RBI suggests that 100 % of current account should consider volatile.

Let us see how the rate of interest depend on several parameters: